In the introduction to his anthology Censorship and Silencing (1998), Robert Post makes the case that attitudes towards censorship, both in academia and beyond, have become much more politically and ideologically controversial in the past few decades. Previously, censorship had been largely associated with the political right, whereas the political left generally advocated for quasi-libertarian attitudes towards free expression. More recently, however, members of groups that are ideologically different in almost every way have converged in pro-censorship views. Post gives the examples of feminist scholars, such as Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, supporting the censorship of pornography, which is generally associated with Christian fundamentalism, or Critical Race Theory scholars joining the Jesse Helms-led conservative movement to ban hate-speech. Post wrote over twenty years ago, and yet, his observations are just as relevant today.

So, what caused this shift in the attitudes of many left-leaning scholars and public figures towards a classically conservative attitude towards free speech? I argue that, in part, the change in the way that censorship was perceived in the social sciences was catalysed by

Foucault’s writings on power and censorship. Hitherto, censorship in academia had been seen as a generally repressive and coercive act, indeed as the antithesis of academic freedom. Viewed through a liberal lens, preventing censorship is a matter of protecting the individual’s negative freedom, i.e., their freedom from restriction. Thus, censorship was defined as the coercive blocking of certain topics and content by an individual, group or state that takes place after the act of expression (see Freshwater, 2003). Michel Foucault and other postmodernist thinkers, though, sought to redefine censorship, showering it with a postmodern dose of radical scepticism and preoccupation with power.

Foucault on power and censorship

For Foucault, censorship was not the coercive and repressive act that modern liberal thinkers described it as. Instead, he saw it as a productive act whose power could be harnessed. Foucault dedicates the first chapter of The History of Sexuality (1978) to discussing the censorship of content relating to sex during the classical period. Central to his hypothesis is that, during this era, loci of power utilised the censorship of sexual content to control the discourse relating to sex, rather than to quell it completely. By inhibiting casual discussions on the topic, powerful entities were able to regulate sexual knowledge production itself. Through censorial means, they dictated the terms and framework through which sex was discussed. Foucault argues that this sparked an “explosion” in the production of discourse regarding sex. He gives the example of schools during the classical period. Every aspect of the design and management, such as classroom arrangements, bedtime monitoring and dormitory layouts, he says, was influenced by this sexual taboo. He calls this “incitement to discourse”, as, according to his thesis, the censorship of sex-related content paradoxically produced an era that was obsessed with sexuality. Foucault began to redefine censorship, uncoupling it from repression and characterising it instead as a positive force.

Another significant contribution Foucault made towards the postmodern redefinition of censorship was the idea that sousveillance can be more effective a mechanism of censorship than surveillance can. During the period in question, the expurgation taking place was not nearly as powerful a censorship tool as were the changing cultural norms that labelled sexual discourse taboo. Foucault writes:

“The forbidding of certain words, the decency of expressions, all the censorings of vocabulary, might well have been only secondary devices compared to that great subjugation: ways of rendering it morally acceptable and technically useful.”

In other words, Foucault argues that social norms, and the self-censorship they encourage, can be more coercive than explicitly repressive devices at controlling speech. In a similar vein to this latter observation, in Discipline and Punish (1975), Foucault uses the analogy of Bentham’s panopticon, a prison in which inmates never know when they are being watched. Foucault sees this as a useful metaphor for power relations in contemporary societies, where citizens self-sensor and modify their behaviour to fit in with social norms, where they are constantly sousveilled by those around them.

Foucault planted the seed of postmodern doubt in the minds of social scientists and thus emerged New Censorship Theory, a branch of postmodern thought that framed censorship as productive rather than repressive.

New Censorship Theory

Pierre Bourdieu was a particularly notable figure in the emergence of New Censorship Theory. Inspired by Foucault’s observations on panoptic societies, Bourdieu developed an idea of self-censorship as a process of pre-emption and anticipation of the way society will respond to certain discourses. The movement subsequently evolved from the contributions made by several key names in the social sciences, including Judith Butler and Michael Holquist. There are several key ways in which the New Censorship movement re-theorised censorship that are fundamental to how the contemporary social sciences perceive freedom of speech and censorship.

First, the movement re-framed censorship as an important and productive force. Much as Foucault saw power and censorship as productive, the academic proponents of New Censorship Theory saw the constructive potential of these concepts, too. In Excitable Speech (1997), Judith Butler explains exactly what is meant by censorship as a “productive” force. It is not to say that censorship is necessarily positive, rather it is “formative”, assisting in the production of discourse, instead of simply the denial of liberty. She describes how censorship could be conceived of as necessary to the realisation of certain social and political aims, giving the example of marginalised communities exercising censorship over others in order to regain control over their own representation. In other words, rather than being purely repressive, censorship can be harnessed as a productive and emancipatory tool. Important to note here is also Herbert Marcuse’s influence on this topic. In his widely cited chapter Repressive Tolerance, Marcuse proposes the concept of “liberating tolerance”, which would involve the censorship of speech that argues against “the extension of public services, social security, medical care, etc.” and other right-wing ideas. He makes the case that this “liberating tolerance” must be primarily enacted in the academic realm, where the freedom of right-wing academics must be limited in order to correct the power imbalances between minority and majority groups. Marcuse was a member of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, and though this chapter concerns itself primarily with postmodern thought, its influence in the shift in attitudes towards censorship in the academy must also be acknowledged.

Censorship was also re-characterised by postmodern scholars as ubiquitous. The aforementioned liberal idea of censorship understands un-censored expression to be “free”. The pioneers of the New Censorship movement subverted this definition and argued that no expression is ever truly free, as orators, writers and artists constantly self-censor as they create. According to Bourdieu, market conditions (i.e. what others will find valuable) affect speech prior to the act of speaking has even begun. The speaker, artist and writer self-censors according to what society will accept and appreciate. Likewise, Bourdieu argues that, in academia, when scholars wish to generate discourse in their given field, they must self-censor in order to adhere to the correct etiquette that is expected from academic literature. An oft-quoted passage from Holquist affirms this idea of censorship as a ubiquitous force, stating:

“To be for or against censorship as such is to assume a freedom no one has. Censorship is. One can only discriminate among its more and less repressive effects.”

As well as censoring to conform to linguistic and stylistic expectations, the New Censorship scholars argued that social and cultural norms constitute another form of ubiquitous censorship. These norms produce what Bourdieu calls structural censorship, where one pre-emptively alters the content of one’s expression in order to fit what is deemed to be socially acceptable. Previously, censorship had been considered to be always an explicit and repressive act. The new theory labelled some forms of censorship as implicit. For Bourdieu, structural censorship forces the individual to self-censor in order to conform to meet the demands of the market (the listener). Accordingly, Bourdieu presents censorship as necessary, and argues that it is most effective when it is implicit and shrouded in cultural norms and customs:

“Censorship is never quite as perfect or as invisible as when each agent has nothing to say apart from what he is objectively authorised to say […] he is […] censored once and for all, through the forms of perception and expression that he has internalised and which impose their form on all his expressions.”

Butler echoes this sentiment six years later, claiming that implicit forms of censorship can be more effective in limiting “speakability”. Part of the reason being that, when censors explicitly ban certain content, it conspicuously draws attention to that which has been censored. The effect is that censors self-sabotage their own work through the very act of explicit censorship. Social norms, on the other hand, censor by rendering certain utterances impossible. “Impossible speech”, for Butler is that which is socially unacceptable to say, that which renders the speaker “asocial” or “psychotic” in the eyes of society.

I find it important to note that these proponents of New Censorship Theory are particularly influential in their fields, and, in fact, their writings on the topic are generally contained within some of their most celebrated works. In 2007, Foucault, Bourdieu and Butler ranked as numbers 1, 2 and 9 respectively as the most cited authors in the humanities. For this reason, the implications of this redefinition of censorship are certainly not to be downplayed.

Implications for academia

That censorship is omnipresent is the inevitable terminus of the ideas raised in this strand of scholarship. As Post asserts, “If censorship is a technique by which discursive practices are maintained, and life largely consists of such practices, it follows that censorship is the norm rather than the exception”. Post acknowledges that once one sees censorship as ubiquitous, one must differentiate between different forms of censorship in order to accept or reject them. However, taken to its extremes, the general thesis of the New Censorship literature has the potential to render the term “censorship” meaningless. As mentioned, these theorists make the point that self-censorship is fundamental to the process of writing and content production, as a writer selects their words through a process of inclusion and exclusion. Although this may be the case, the process of self-censoring due to fear of reprisal or judgement is hardly the same as self-censorship as an artistic choice. Within the New Censorship framework, though, these are presented essentially as one and the same, since societal norms and values are both seen as effective and potentially productive tools of censorship. A gender-critical feminist scholar, for example, may self-censor in order to avoid being ostracised by colleagues. This is far from being an artistic choice and rather a type of censorship based on academic social norms. By redefining censorship as a ubiquitous and inevitable element of discourse, one takes the negative connotations away from the term “censorship”. In addition to this, Butler’s (and Marcuse’s) suggestion that censorship can be used as a tool for social justice could conceivably be used to justify censorships according to the political and ideological whims of censures (or violent student demonstrators at universities, for example).

My concern is that, once censorship is normalised as a concept, the moral outrage previously invoked by incidents of censorship may be eroded. I believe that classifying social norms as a form of censorship leads us down a slippery slope that ends with advocating for the use of explicit censorship as a tool for enforcing the popular dogma or theory of the day. Unfortunately, I suspect we’re already well on our way down said slippery slope, as 40% of millennials in the US believe that the censorship by government of potentially offensive content is justified.

There is now a growing disconnect between those who believe that self-censorship is a form of repression and those who see it is a positive tool for achieving progress. I believe that addressing this divide will be impossible without an understanding of the theories and literature that have led a generous portion of the population down this path.

After studying Architecture at the University of Nottingham, Laura Walker-Beaven worked in fundraising and international development. She recently completed a masters in Human Rights, during which she became increasingly concerned about the impact of Critical Social Justice on universities.

Academic freedom has faced numerous challenges over time. In the UK, a 1963 report on higher education regarded the greatest threat to academic freedom as being political influence. Recently, the debate surrounding academic freedom has been resurrected, as threats to freedom of speech appear to emerge from within academia itself. In December 2020, Civitas published a report on academic freedom in UK universities, which reviewed incidents of speech censorship between 2017 and 2019. At universities across the UK, Civitas observed instances of speech restrictions and censorship by way of restrictive campus speech codes, instances of no-platforming, and ‘cancel culture’ petitions and letters. Other think tanks and advocacy organisations have similarly expressed concern over the reported decline of academic freedom in universities in the UK and beyond (see UCU; Policy Exchange; Heterodox Academy; Gallup; Woman’s Place UK).

Of course, some deny the existence of a free speech crisis, often claiming that right-wing speakers have fabricated it in order to protect their ability to continue espousing questionable views on university campuses (see Fowles; Smith). These critics, however, fail to consider the wealth of literature coming from left-leaning academics and journalists also discussing the threats to academic freedom. For instance, the Harper’s Letter, which argues in favour of protecting free and open debate, counted Noam Chomsky, Salman Rushdie and Samuel Moyn amongst its signatories, indicating the bipartisan support for this cause.

Amidst this growing public concern over campus censorship, the UK government recently appointed a Free Speech and Academic Freedom Champion. As so often happens in public discourse, views on the topic are often highly polarised and attribute the “free speech crisis” at universities to various single-issue and highly politicised concerns. Instead, in this article I present some of the research and contemporary thought exploring potential factors that could threaten academic freedom. In an effort to avoid dichotomous thinking, this article considers different approaches to the issue and accepts that the cause of declining academic freedom is likely a complex amalgamation of the issues discussed here—and many more.

The political economy of censorship

A substantial body of literature suggests that threats to academic freedom, particularly in the UK and the US, have increased due to the neoliberal privatisation of universities. Professor Anna Traianou argues that the commercialisation of knowledge production has negatively impacted the intellectual freedom of academics. In the 1980s and 90s, a considerable shift took place in how higher education was conceptualised. The UK government began encouraging more of the population to attend university in order to compete globally in the emerging knowledge economy. According to Traianou, public sector funding for universities could not meet the resource demands incurred by the sudden influx of students. As a result, tuition fees were introduced, compelling universities to compete for funding. The Civitas report similarly proposes that privatisations have led university management to treat students as customers, producing a paradigm that prioritises customer satisfaction over academic freedom and knowledge production. Although the issue of university privatisation is undeniably multifaceted, Traianou and Civitas’ arguments make a compelling case for why public sector funding may allow universities to better pursue truth and knowledge unencumbered by the whims of their student customers.

Sociologist Adam Hedgecoe suggests that the establishment of research ethics committees in UK universities has also contributed to the threat to academic freedom. For those unfamiliar with the inner workings of universities, research ethics committees are groups of academics who judge whether proposed research projects are ethical. While the necessity of these committees may be abundantly obvious within the context of medical research, for instance, the encroachment of these into the social sciences has been the subject of many debates. In his study, Hedgecoe finds evidence that these committees tend to prioritise the reputation of the university rather than the ethics of research praxis. He theorises that sensitive or controversial research projects may be denied permission to proceed by these committees because they pose reputational risks to the university. Hedgecoe further suggests that these bodies promote academic cultures that prioritise public image over academic freedom and the pursuit of knowledge, the effects of which become even more significant when combined with the commercialisation of higher education. While Hedgecoe takes a decidedly measured approach to his research, other academics have spoken out more vocally about the potential for research ethics committees to curb academic freedom. Sociologist Martyn Hammersley, for example, has written a number of articles arguing that ethics committees tend to emphasise the individual autonomy of the research subject, but ignore that of the researcher. Hammersley also questions whether the ethics of a social sciences proposal can truly be decided by such a committee. He makes the point that this very act is hubristic in that it assumes that one could conclusively decide whether a proposal is ethical or not. Hammersley asserts that the existence of such committees “amounts not only to a bureaucratization of research but also to unwarranted restriction on the freedom of researchers”.

The Civitas report suggests that the development of equality policies, which rightly seek to protect minority students from discrimination, may go too far in limiting speech. “The university institution,” states the report, “is not created for the primary purpose of prohibiting discrimination—its founders do so for the purposes of providing places of higher education and learning”. Law professors Ian Cram and Helen Fenwick make a similar point, arguing that recent changes to UK counter-terrorism law could incentivise universities to cancel potentially controversial events. Cram and Fenwick explain that UK law changed to place duty on universities themselves to actively prevent potential instances of radicalisation and extremist content. The authors claim that the law already contained sufficient protection against such content and that including the “prevent” clause encourages universities to pre-emptively cancel or prevent campus events that may include or lead to “extremist expression”. The authors claim that this policy is excessively broad and ill-defined, potentially leading to universities restricting ideologically diverse content in accordance with the new laws.

Ideological influences

Taking a rather different approach to the works outlined above, other scholars adopt positions that correlate declining academic freedom with the rise of certain ideological movements. Greg Lukianoff and Jonathan Haidt, in The Coddling of the American Mind, posit that free speech in universities may be placed in jeopardy by growing cultures of “safetyism”, resulting in over-protective attitudes towards children both at home and at school. Lukianoff and Haidt argue that protecting children against adversity instils a mindset in young people that seeks to avoid discomfort or feelings of offence. Subsequently, according to the authors, when students arrive at university, they lack the cognitive toolkit required to confront ideas that fundamentally contradict their own worldviews and react by demanding “safe-spaces” free from intellectual discomfort. This, combined with privatisation, means that universities may be more inclined to compromise their commitment to academic freedom and open enquiry in order to appease their increasingly “coddled” customer base.

Others attribute the reported decline of academic freedom to the rise of postmodernism within academia. Public intellectuals Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay, in their book Cynical Theories, outline the principles of postmodernism and map the journey of these concepts from their roots in the poststructuralism of Foucault and Derrida through to critical theorists in fields such as postcolonialism and, more recently, intersectional feminism, critical race theory and queer theory. They argue that these fields have formed an academic oligopoly that poses a fundamental threat to Enlightenment and scientific forms of reasoning. Although the authors touch only briefly on academic freedom directly, the implications are clear; the modus operandi of these critical social justice theories seem to be at odds with the established norms and justifications for academic freedom.

Philosopher John Sanbonmatsu makes a similar case, arguing that nihilism, stemming from the poststructuralist denial of the existence of objective truth, has come to monopolise academic thought. He claims that the effect of this has been to “blunt the critical imagination and to erode our capacity for truth-telling”. Sanbonmatsu suggests that the reason for postmodernism’s success in universities, despite opposition from almost all other ideological perspectives within the academy, has been its ability to morph and adapt into new forms. These ideas have penetrated each field of the humanities so profoundly that the term theory itself, argues Sanbonmatsu, has become synonymous with postmodern. This postmodern domination of academia, he claims, has shut down academic enquiry and “penalises those who dissent from its ideological frame”. Indeed, if Sanbonmatsu is right, the pervasive nature of this subset of academic theories could be seen as hegemonic in its monopolisation of academic thought. This could result in a “tyranny of the majority” effect in academia, whereby academics are openly discouraged from conducting research that opposes popular philosophies stemming from postmodernism. A particularly topical example of this is Kathleen Stock of Sussex University, my alma mater, who has been publicly denounced by the University and College Union for her critical stance on postmodern theories of gender and has now resigned after harassment by activist students and lack of support from colleagues. Although this, and many contemporary examples of campus censorship, may stem from postmodernism and its offshoots, the same could be conceivably said for any theory or ideology that comes to dominate academia.

This article has touched on research and thought from two approaches to the academic freedom debate. As I mentioned in the introduction, I fear the discourse on the topic tends to place the blame of declining academic freedom on single issues rather than considering its complexity, stemming as it does from the amalgamation of intersecting causes. Perhaps by broadening our view of the university free speech debate, we can better consider the steps necessary to bolster academic freedom in UK universities and beyond.

After studying Architecture at the University of Nottingham, Laura Walker-Beaven worked in fundraising and international development. She recently completed a masters in Human Rights, during which she became increasingly concerned about the impact of Critical Social Justice on universities.

It can be difficult to find clear information about gender dysphoria online, so we compiled answers to some questions you may have about the topic. This text should serve as an introduction for readers who hope to engage with the literature discussing gender, but who know very little about the issues to begin with.

What is gender dysphoria?

Gender dysphoria is a condition in which a person feels as though their sex at birth is mismatched with the gender they identify most with. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 0.005–0.014% of biological males suffer from gender dysphoria and 0.002–0.003% of biological females do so, although this is changing due to recent surges in gender dysphoria diagnoses. There is no doubt about the existence of gender dysphoria as a legitimate condition that can be alleviated by going through a series of medical processes known as “transitioning”, in which an individual’s body is made to look and feel more similar to that of the gender they identify with. The causes of gender dysphoria are still unclear.

What does “transitioning” mean?

Transitioning can take several different forms and does not always involve surgery or irreversible procedures. The two types of transitions are social and medical.

What is the difference between a medical transition and a social transition?

Social transitioning is when a person chooses to present themselves as a member of the opposite sex. This may be through aesthetic changes such as clothing and hairstyles and could also include going by a different name and pronouns. Steps taken to socially transition are generally reversible. A medical transition is characterised by the use of medical interventions such as puberty blockers, hormone treatment and surgery. Some types of medical transitions, such as puberty blockers, are reversible, whereas surgery is generally permanent.

What is the difference between “sex” and “gender”?

Although the words “sex” and “gender” are often used interchangeably, they refer to different concepts. “Sex” is assigned at birth and describes the difference between men, who have XY chromosomes, and women, who have XX chromosomes. “Gender”, on the other hand, is broadly defined as the social elements of what it means to be a man or woman. This concept of gender as malleable and shaped by environmental factors was developed in the 1960s and 70s. The field of Gender Theory, which has become popularised since that period, generally posits that masculinity and femininity are socially constructed. Some gender academics even propose that sex is socially constructed. This field is not without criticism. Studies have shown that men and women are different in many ways including psychological traits, hormone levels and many observable traits. In addition to this, there is evidence that babies of just three months old prefer toys associated with their sex. This is also observable in rhesus monkeys, who preferred playing with toys associated with their sex, thereby casting doubt on the idea that these traits are solely developed through socialisation.

What does it feel like to suffer from gender dysphoria?

Children suffering from gender dysphoria can exhibit a number of symptoms including refusing toys designed for their sex, urinating in the position of the opposite sex and repeatedly stating they are really of the opposite sex. In teenagers and adults, gender dysphoria can cause deep disgust of one’s own genitals and the strong belief that their real gender is not the same as their biological sex. This is often accompanied by feelings of isolation and depression.

What’s the difference between the terms “gender dysphoria”, “transgender” and “gender non-conforming”?

As described above, “gender dysphoria” is a condition in which an individual feels that they do not identify with their sex. A “transgender” person is someone whose gender identity is different to their sex. A “gender non-conforming” person is someone whose appearance or behaviour does not align with what one might expect from a member of their sex.

What about parents of children who are questioning their gender?

One can only imagine how difficult it must be for people struggling with gender dysphoria. It must also be challenging for parents and family members of these individuals to respond to the revelation that a child does not identify as their biological sex. On top of the difficulty parents might face in understanding their children’s desire to change gender, parents can face even more challenges from those around them. Social media shaming and excessively PC school policies are just two challenges faced by parents who question their child regarding issues of gender.

Is gender dysphoria permanent?

Around 80% of gender non-conforming children grow up to be cisgender (i.e. identifying as the same gender they were born as). However, when gender dysphoria persists through puberty, it is usually permanent. Some research has shown that adults with gender dysphoria can have brain structures that are somewhere in between male and female brain structures.

Does body image and mental health play a role?

One study on teenage girls in the US found that 50% of 13-year olds felt unhappy with their bodies, growing to 80% by the time the girls reached the age of 17. Adolescence is a difficult time for young people. Being uncomfortable in their own bodies is perfectly normal.

Indeed, certain mental health problems have been found to correlate with feelings of gender dysphoria. There is anecdotal evidence of young people mistaking body image issues and depression for gender dysphoria.

In 2020, Keira Bell brought a case to the UK High Court. Keira had begun transitioning into a boy when she was a teenager but had changed her mind and de-transitioned. She claimed that she had been given false hope that transitioning would solve all her problems. She said:

I made a brash decision as a teenager, as a lot of teenagers do, trying to find confidence and happiness, except now the rest of my life will be negatively affected. Transition was a very temporary, superficial fix for a very complex identity issue.

Of course, disentangling causality in those who are—or simply believe themselves to be —suffering from gender dysphoria can be tricky. Those who genuinely and persistently believe themselves to be in the wrong body would doubtless be vulnerable to mental health issues and body issues.

What’s the role of sexuality?

Around 75% of boys who are gender-nonconforming grow up to be gay adults. In fact, gender-nonconformity in childhood is one of the best predictors of homosexuality in adulthood.

What treatment is given to children who question their gender?

When a child is thought to have gender dysphoria and is brought to a gender clinic, they will generally be required to see a number of different specialists over the course of a few months. As stated on the NHS website, many interventions involve psychological support rather than medical because gender dysphoria has a tendency to subside during puberty. Children may also be given puberty blockers, designed to pause the physical changes that usually occur during puberty. In the UK, after the age of 16, children may be given cross-sex hormones. These have more permanent effects and involve giving female patients the male hormone (testosterone) and male patients the female hormone (oestrogen). In the US, puberty blockers and hormone therapy can be administered to children under the age of 16 in the majority of states, while in some states treatment for children under 16 is banned. In Arkansas, doctors cannot provide any treatment for gender dysphoria to patients under the age of 18.

Are there any side effects of these treatments?

Puberty blockers do have a number of side-effects, some of which are relatively benign, for example headaches, muscle aches and changes in weight. Other more serious side-effects include lower bone density, changes in mood and delayed growth plate closure. The effects of puberty blockers are thought to be reversible – once a patient stops taking these blockers, puberty will resume, although longer term effects are still unknown and researchers are yet to discover whether puberty blockers affect brain development.

The side-effects of taking cross-sex hormones are still largely unknown. However, the few studies done have suggested that transgender women who were on the hormones had a greater risk of mortality, while transgender men had increased blood pressure and insulin resistance. In addition to this, infertility is a very common side-effect of long-term use of cross-sex hormones.

Although it is not a treatment per-se, chest binders are sometimes used by biological women who wish to give the appearance of a flat chest. It has been shown that the use of chest binders, a tight piece of cloth which is wrapped around the chest, comes with considerable side-effects. 53% of participants experienced back pain and 47% reported shortness of breath as a result of chest binding. Rarer side-effects can include spinal misalignment and rib damage.

Can children give informed consent for gender dysphoria treatments?

Despite the potential for harm, UK gender clinics have found a legal loophole through which pharmacies can administer hormone medication prescribed by doctors in any part of the EU and outside the jurisdiction of UK regulators. This was discovered when a reporter posing as a 15-year-old girl was prescribed testosterone by a gender clinic without parental knowledge. This raises the issue of informed consent. In the UK, children under the age of 16 are unable to consent to sexual intercourse, while those under 18 cannot marry, drink alcohol or vote in elections. These age limits are put in place because adolescents are not deemed to be capable of assessing decisions in the same way that a fully developed adult would. This is because the frontal cortex, the brain’s decision-making powerhouse, is not fully developed. While an adult should be well within their rights to transition if they decide to, a child may not be capable of making a decision that has such life-altering consequences, infertility being one of them.

Science has a long way to go in researching the causes and treatments of gender dysphoria, so open and honest dialogue about these issues will be increasingly important as we move forward. We can do this by learning the facts, keeping an open mind and treating everyone with dignity.

After studying Architecture at the University of Nottingham, Laura Walker-Beaven worked in fundraising and international development. She is currently studying a masters in Human Rights, during which she has become increasingly concerned about the impact of Critical Social Justice on universities.